ANALYSIS: Why coal power declined faster in some European countries than others

A country can cut coal-fired electricity sharply while increasing electricity generation from fossil fuels overall. Greece did exactly that in 2024.

Lignite generation fell by 28.3%, according to The Green Tank’s analysis of national electricity data. Yet gas generation increased by 35.9%, and total electricity production from fossil fuels rose. Renewable generation also expanded, but not enough to prevent that increase.

Germany’s experience was different. Agora Energiewende attributed its declining coal generation in 2024 to increased renewable output and electricity imports, with electricity consumption broadly stable.

Both countries used less coal. Their electricity systems nevertheless changed in different ways.

This is the central distinction in Europe’s coal transition: how much coal disappears matters, but so do the sources replacing it, changes in demand and the electricity exchanged across borders.

Coal demand is declining, but national transitions differ

The International Energy Agency’s Coal Mid-Year Update 2025 reported that coal demand in the European Union fell by approximately 40 million tonnes, or 11%, in 2024, largely because of reduced coal-fired electricity generation.

This figure covers coal consumption across the economy, rather than electricity generation alone. It should therefore not be interpreted as an 11% decline in coal-fired electricity. It nevertheless shows that the retreat from coal extended to the EU’s overall consumption of the fuel.

National comparisons require three distinct measures: the amount of coal-fired electricity generated, coal’s share of domestic electricity production, and how those quantities change over time. A large electricity system can generate more coal-fired electricity than a smaller one while depending on coal for a lower proportion of its supply.

The country examples below illustrate different routes away from coal. They are not a harmonised ranking of national transition speeds.

Germany: renewables and trade reduced the need for domestic coal

Agora Energiewende’s assessment of Germany’s energy year 2024 identified renewable growth and increased electricity imports as important contributors to lower conventional generation. Electricity consumption remained broadly stable.

Its preliminary analysis reported renewable generation equivalent to approximately 55% of gross electricity consumption. It also estimated that 49% of imported electricity came from renewable sources.

That combination matters. Additional renewable production was not absorbed by rapid demand growth, while imports further reduced the electricity that domestic plants needed to supply.

However, declining domestic coal generation should not automatically be treated as an equivalent reduction in European emissions. Electricity imported into Germany is generated elsewhere. Assessing the wider climate effect requires examining the sources supplying those imports and how neighbouring systems respond.

Trade can help countries use available low-carbon electricity more efficiently. But national generation statistics alone cannot establish the emissions associated with electricity consumption.

Greece: a coal decline alongside a fossil increase

Greece’s 2024 electricity balance shows particularly clearly why coal should not be examined in isolation.

The Green Tank reported the following changes from 2023:

Source: The Green Tank. Total calculated by adding the reported changes. TWh means terawatt-hours.

Demand increased by 2.960 terawatt-hours, while net imports fell by 5.219 terawatt-hours as Greece moved from being a net importer to a net exporter. Together, these changes required approximately 8.179 terawatt-hours of additional domestic generation—matching the generation calculation within rounding.

The balance reveals more than lignite’s percentage decline.

Gas generation increased by approximately 4.4 times the amount by which lignite generation fell. That ratio does not show that gas directly replaced lignite: demand and trade changed too. It shows that expanding gas production went far beyond the size of the coal reduction.

Adding gas, oil and lignite together gives an increase in fossil generation of approximately 4.566 terawatt-hours. Adding renewables and large hydropower gives an increase of approximately 3.612 terawatt-hours.

Greece generated more low-carbon electricity and less lignite, but more fossil electricity overall. The transition away from coal was therefore further advanced than the transition away from fossil generation.

Poland: replacement supply meets a larger structural challenge

Poland also reduced coal generation in 2024. The IEA’s Electricity 2025 assessment described rising renewable and gas-fired output alongside lower coal generation, with electricity demand increasing by approximately 0.7%.

The direction of change resembles parts of the Greek experience, but the starting position is different.

The IEA’s Poland 2022 review identified coal dependence in both electricity and building heating as a central challenge. It also highlighted subsidies to the coal industry and the sector’s importance for employment in several regions.

Replacing generation does not automatically replace the economic activity surrounding mines and power stations. Workers, suppliers and municipalities can depend on the same industrial system.

That helps explain why transition policy must address more than electricity supply. Investment in replacement generation, grids and flexibility needs to be accompanied by credible opportunities for affected communities.

These structural conditions help interpret Poland’s transition. Quantifying their contribution requires examining generation, demand and trade together, rather than attributing the change to a single factor.

Britain: a policy deadline followed a long retreat

Great Britain’s last coal-fired electricity station, Ratcliffe-on-Soar, closed in September 2024. The final closure completed a decline that had already removed most coal generation.

The UK government’s 2021 phase-out announcement reported that coal’s share of UK electricity generation had fallen from approximately 40% in 2012 to 1.8% in 2020. The government then brought forward the deadline for ending unabated coal power to October 2024.

There is also research evidence for a policy contribution. A study publicised by University College London in 2020 found that Britain’s Carbon Price Support increased the cost of coal generation and contributed to its decline, which accelerated after the tax increased in 2015. The researchers also examined the role of electricity imports.

This is a different kind of evidence from observing coal decline alongside renewable growth: the study attempted to identify a policy’s effect.

Britain’s experience nevertheless involved several changes, not a single intervention. A closure deadline establishes an endpoint, while alternative supply and system reliability determine whether that endpoint is feasible.

A national coal ranking cannot capture these different transitions.

For a meaningful assessment, coal output should be considered alongside total fossil generation, power-sector emissions, demand and electricity trade. Multi-year trends are more informative than a single annual change, which can be affected by weather or plant outages.

The data also have limits. The IEA’s EU-wide coal-consumption figures, Agora Energiewende’s assessment of Germany and The Green Tank’s Greek electricity balance measure different aspects of the transition. Their national boundaries and estimation methods can differ. They are used here to explain distinct developments, rather than combined into a single comparable country ranking.

The evidence available by December 2025 showed a widespread retreat from coal. It also showed several routes away from it: greater renewable generation, increased imports, expanding gas output and the final retirement of plants that had already become marginal.

Those routes do not deliver identical outcomes. A country that replaces coal with low-carbon electricity makes a different transition from one that reduces coal while expanding fossil generation overall.

Coal’s decline is an important measure of progress. The fuller test is whether reliable electricity is delivered with fewer emissions—and whether that improvement persists as demand changes.

Sources

• International Energy Agency, Coal Mid-Year Update 2025 — Demand.
• International Energy Agency, Electricity 2025.
• International Energy Agency, Poland 2022.
• Agora Energiewende, Germany’s energy transition in 2024: renewable generation, coal and electricity imports.
• The Green Tank, Trends in electricity production — December 2024.
• UK Government, End to coal power brought forward to October 2024.
• UK Parliament, Coal industry — statement confirming the closure of Britain’s last coal-fired power station.
• University College London, Research on Carbon Price Support and declining coal-fired electricity.